We show that the principle of minimum differentiation holds in two-round elections, for any number of candidates, regardless of the presence of entrants, or the distribution of voters' preferences. q 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Introduction
showed that two candidates competing in an election will both choose the position of the median voter as their platform. This result Ž . Ž . was coined the principal of minimum differentiation MD by Boulding 1966 . Later work, however, showed that this result is highly sensitive to the assumptions made. In particular, the principle of minimum differentiation no longer holds with more than two candidates, the possibility of entry, or a change in the underlying distribution of voters' preferences. In this paper, we show that MD is restored under a runoff system, where only the two most successful candidates in the first round are allowed to run in the ( ) second. Our result is robust to changes in the number of candidates, to the possibility of entry, and the distribution of voters' preferences.
Ž . In a seminal paper, Hotelling 1929 showed that two firms, in choosing a location on a straight line, will locate exactly in the middle. 1 He also suggested that this model could be applied to the case of political competition, where it implies that Aeach party 2 Ž . strives to make its platform as much like the other as possibleB. Downs 1957 studied this application in more detail. In his model, when two candidates participating in an election locate in an ideological space, both will choose a position that is equal to that of Ž . the median voter. Eaton and Lipsey 1975 relax several of the assumptions of the HotellingrDowns model. They show that MD no longer holds when more than two candidates are competing. Notably, with three candidates, a Nash equilibrium fails to Ž . exist. These results were also proven by Selten 1971 . Also, for n ) 2, the equilibrium depends on the probability distribution of voters' positions on the line. Prescott All these results, when interpreted in a political context, assume that candidates choose a location so as to maximize the share of the vote. As the candidate with the highest share of the vote wins the election, this seems a reasonable approach. Real-world elections, however, often do not work this way. In numerous countries, such as in France, Portugal, and Austria, the winner of, for example, a presidential election is Ž . decided in two rounds, if necessary see e.g. Lijphart, 1994 . In the first round, many candidates run. In the second round, or runoff, only the two most successful candidates from the first round are allowed to compete. 4 Voters choose between these two to decide who ultimately wins the election. This system is also used in all presidential elections in Ž . Latin America see Cox, 1997 . Other countries, such as Australia, use an Alternative Vote system to elect the House of Representatives. In this system, voters already announce in the first round who they will vote for should their favorite candidate be eliminated in the first round. For more on this system, see, for example, Bogdanor Ž . 1983 . It can easily be seen that the results we derive in this paper also hold for an Alternative Vote system. 1 Ž . In fact, d 'Aspremont et al. 1979 show that Hotelling's analysis is incorrect. With linear transportation costs, as Hotelling assumes, they show that two firms choose to locate at the endpoints of the interval, rather than in the middle. By competing in price, firms may also be able to attract the consumers that are located in the AbackyardB of their competitor, a possibility that Hotelling does not take into account. Yet, as politicians do not set prices, this does not affect the minimum differentiation result for the case of political competition. Ž . Osborne and Slivinski 1996 also study a runoff system. However, they assume citizen-candidates, i.e. each candidate uses his own preference as a platform in the election, rather than choosing a platform that maximizes the chance of winning the election.
( )
In this paper, we show that MD is restored when elections are held under a runoff system. We show that, regardless of the number of initial candidates, all of them will choose the position of the median voter. Moreover, this result carries through in circumstances when the distribution of voters' preferences is not uniform. Finally, we show that our result also holds when potential entry is taken into account. Section 2 considers the standard case, with n candidates and a uniform distribution of voters' preferences. In Section 3 we show that entry does not change our results. Section 4 generalizes to any distribution of voters' preferences. Section 5 concludes.
Why a runoff system restores MD
Consider the following set-up. We have an election with two rounds. In the first round, n candidates participate. The two candidates with the highest share of the vote proceed to the second round. The candidate with the largest share of the vote in that round wins the election. w x Preferences are represented by a horizontal line, normalized to 0, 1 . Before the first round, every candidate i chooses his position P . We assume that this position cannot be i changed between rounds, for example since such a shift in position would undermine the candidate's credibility, destroying his chances to win the election. Voters are uniformly w x distributed on 0, 1 , an assumption we will relax in Section 4. Voters always vote for the candidate with the position that is closest to theirs, i.e. there is sincere voting. In case of a tie, they decide randomly which candidate to vote for. We can now establish the following result. Theorem 1. When Õoters' preferences are uniformly distributed, the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium has all candidates choosing the position of the median Õoter:
Proof of Theorem 1. Since the case n s 2 is the standard one-round case already Ž . considered by Hotelling 1929 , we restrict attention to n ) 2. First assume that all candidates i s 1, . . . , n set P s 1r2. Now suppose that candidate n considers a . Ž . 1r2 y P r2 r n y 1 s 3r4 y P r2 r n y 1 . Candidate n will reach the secn n ond round with certainty whenever S 1 ) S 1 , thus if
With n s 3, this condition is satisfied for P X ) 1r6, Any defection with P X -1r6 then n n implies that candidate n already drops out in the first round. With n s 4, it is satisfied for P X ) 0. For larger n, it always holds. However, when candidate n follows such a n defection, he will face a runoff with some candidate j who has P s 1r2. He will j 2 Ž .
X Ž . always lose this runoff: his share of the vote will equal S s 1r2 P q 1r4 , whereas n n 2 Ž . Ž .
X X that of his competitor equals S s 3r4 y 1r2 P , which, with P -1r2, is always i n n Ž . higher. Thus, defecting from an equilibrium with P s 1r2 ; , is never profitable. The i i uniqueness of the symmetric Nash equilibrium is trivial. Suppose there is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium with P / 1r2, and equal for all i. Then any candidate j i can improve by defecting to P s 1r2. By doing so, he wins both the first and second j round. I
The above proof also provides an intuition for this result. By choosing a position different from that of the median voter, a candidate may win the first round. In the second round, however, he will be beaten by one of the candidates that did choose the median voter's position. 
The case of potential entry
Ž . Prescott and Visscher 1977 argue that MD no longer holds when candidates consider the possibility of entry of third candidates. When two incumbents do choose the median position, they argue, such an entrant can secure almost half of the vote by entering just to the left or just to the right of the median voter, leaving the original incumbents with only 1r4 of the vote. When incumbents anticipate this possibility, they will not locate at the median voter but, rather, at positions 1r4 and 3r4.
In our model, however, this argument does not hold. Suppose that n candidates are located at 1r2, and a new candidate enters. The best the new candidate can do is locate at 1r2 as well, by the same argument as in the Proof of Theorem 1. Entering at any other location will result in losing the election in the second round. Hence, the incumbents do not have an incentive to locate differently. We thus have Theorem 2. With potential entry, the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium has all candidates choosing the position of the median Õoter.
5 Admittedly, the equilibrium described in the theorem is not the unique Nash equilibrium. For example, Ž . with ns 4, the same argument as in the proof can be used to show that P s P s 1r2 y´, and 1 2 Ž . P s P s 1r2 q´is also an equilibrium, for small enough´. Yet, such an equilibrium does not exist for all 3 4 n. With n odd, it can be shown that no other Nash equilibrium exists. Also, we believe that the equilibrium in the text is the most natural one. In any non-symmetric equilibrium, some coordination mechanism is needed to determine which candidate chooses which position. Such problems do not exist in our equilibrium. Therefore, Ž . we believe our equilibrium is focal in the sense of Schelling 1960 . ( ) 
The case of a general distribution function
So far, we have restricted attention to the case in which the preferences of the voters Ž . are uniformly distributed. Eaton and Lipsey 1975 show that, with n ) 2, the equilibrium depends on the distribution of voters. In this section, we show that, in our set-up, this distribution does not affect the results. attention to the case n ) 2, the case n s 2 being the standard one-round case already Ž . proven by Eaton and Lipsey 1975 . Assume that all candidates i s 1, . . . , n set P s p . . . Ž . certainty whenever S ) S , thus if F P q p r2 ) 1rn . This is intuitive; it implies n i n m that the share of the vote of candidate n is higher than the average share of the vote of all n voters. Suppose n chooses a defection such that this condition is met. Then, in the second round, he will face a runoff with some candidate j with P s p . He will always j m lose this runoff. I
Conclusion
It is well established that two candidates that try to win an election will both choose a location in ideological space that coincides with that of the median voter. Yet, a wealth of literature suggests that this result is not robust. In particular, this principal of minimum differentiation does not hold with more than two candidates, when the distribution of voters' preferences is not uniform or if there is potential entry. Yet, this literature assumes that elections are held in only one round, and that the candidate with the highest share of the vote wins the election. Many real-world elections do not work this way. Often, an election consists of two rounds. In the first round, all candidates participate. In the second round, only the two candidates with the best result in the first round can run. In this paper, we showed that, in such elections, the principle of minimum differentiation again holds. Moreover, this result is robust with respect to the number of candidates, the distribution of voters' preferences and potential entry. Therefore, a runoff system restores the principle of minimum differentiation, regardless of the exact specification of the model. 
